Obama’s Nobel no longer undeserved
ReutersAmong the accomplishments of the Nobel Laureate which were enumerated by the Nobel Committee were his Cairo speech to reach out to the Muslim world.- T.P. Sreenivasan
Barack Obama's accomplishments listed by the Nobel Committee will not match his recent, path-breaking moves towards Myanmar, Cuba and Iran.
In 2009, when the Norwegian Nobel Committee decided that the Nobel Peace Prize was to be awarded to U.S. President
Barack Obama “for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international
diplomacy and cooperation between peoples”, and within the first year
of his election as the American President, no one, not even the
recipient himself, thought that he deserved it. “There was a sense of
surprise and even shock,… a belief that the award was premature, a
disservice and a political liability,” said a Washington Post
commentator. The Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Thorbjørn
Jagland, himself, denied the charitable suggestion that the award was in
anticipation of Mr. Obama living up to his promise. “We have not given
the prize for what may happen in the future. We are awarding Obama for
what he has done in the past year,” he said.
Among
the accomplishments of the Nobel Laureate which were enumerated by the
Nobel Committee were his Cairo speech to reach out to the Muslim world,
and his Prague speech, which announced his commitment to a nuclear
weapon-free world and his initiatives on climate change. But none of
these will match his recent, path-breaking moves towards Myanmar, Cuba
and Iran. All American soldiers have not come home from Afghanistan,
Iraq and elsewhere, but the image of the United States today is of a
restrained and reasonable power, and not of a Don Quixote tilting at
windmills. Mr. Obama is now looking more like a Nobel Laureate than he
did in 2009.
The lifting of sanctions against Myanmar
even before democracy was restored was a concession to the military
junta there. The dramatic handshake and subsequent meeting with
President Raúl Castro of Cuba in Panama, recently, is indeed historic.
On Iran, Mr. Obama is taking major risks, having to battle not only with
Iran, but also with Israel, Saudi Arabia and his own Congress. No other
American President has taken so many initiatives with global
implications in a short time. All the deals are not done, but each of
these could lead to the ending of some festering conflicts and to
greater economic benefits to the U.S. and others.
Mr.
Obama seems to have come to realise what Winston Churchill knew a long
time ago: “To jaw-jaw is always better than war-war.” The new Obama
doctrine is that engagement combined with addressing core needs is more
useful than sanctions. Breaking isolationist policies for strategic
advantage is the new approach of the Obama administration. With its
immense power and resources, the U.S. can afford to take some calculated
risks. It can also retrace its steps if its partners fail to abide by
their commitments or adopt inimical postures. Increasing strategic depth
by making concessions even while keeping options open is a refreshingly
novel idea that Mr. Obama has put in place.
Iran nuclear deal
Among his new initiatives, striking a deal with Iran over its nuclear programme has been the riskiest. Given the nature of the Iranian regime and the volatility of its neighbourhood, there is no guarantee that the deal will be implemented. The Iran nuclear deal is still a framework and there is many a slip between the cup and the lip. Mr. Obama himself admits that the deal is fraught with risks for the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia. The fact sheets and statements by the two sides are contradictory and the chances of reconciling them before the end of June this year are by no means assured.
Among his new initiatives, striking a deal with Iran over its nuclear programme has been the riskiest. Given the nature of the Iranian regime and the volatility of its neighbourhood, there is no guarantee that the deal will be implemented. The Iran nuclear deal is still a framework and there is many a slip between the cup and the lip. Mr. Obama himself admits that the deal is fraught with risks for the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia. The fact sheets and statements by the two sides are contradictory and the chances of reconciling them before the end of June this year are by no means assured.
Something
most fundamental to the framework like the period for which the
restrictions imposed by the agreement will last is still unclear. The
U.S. mentions 15 years, while the Iranian figure is 10 years. The
provision relating to the shipping out of low-enriched uranium, leaving
only 300 to 500 kg on Iran’s soil, and even about the destination of the
shipment, are vague. Some years ago, Brazil had worked out a similar
arrangement, which was disowned by both the U.S. and Iran. It is also
not clear how Iran would be prevented from reconverting any remaining
enriched uranium. Converting the facility in Fordow into a research
laboratory was a painful decision for Iran. But, with the infrastructure
preserved there, the temptation to go back to its original mission will
remain.
The monitoring mechanism will be the hardest
nut to crack when the deal is finalised. The deep distrust between the
two countries will not disappear in a hurry and the intrusive
monitoring, which goes beyond the provisions of the Additional Protocol
that Iran had accepted a long time ago, will be hard to put in place.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports are replete with
instances of its inspectors being turned away from sensitive
installations. The devil in the details of the monitoring mechanism will
raise its head throughout the period of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear
activities. The selling point of the deal for the Iranians is that the
nuclear infrastructure will remain intact and that the “break out”
period for Iran, now two months, has been extended only to one year for
the next 15 years. Iran will zealously guard this capability, with its
attendant effects on monitoring.
Iran’s supreme
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s accusations recently, about the Obama
administration “lying and having deceptive and devilish intentions” may
be to toughen Iran’s bargaining position in the next two months, but his
insistence that all sanctions must be lifted as soon as the agreement
is signed is most unrealistic.
Mr. Obama will not be
in a position to give any such guarantee, given the position of the
Congress. Moreover, there is no intention on his part to remove the
sanctions relating to human rights and terrorism. Since Iran’s sole
motivation for the deal is to get the crippling sanctions lifted, this
may well be the biggest hurdle in its finalisation and implementation.
A reconnection with Cuba
The U.S. has nothing to lose by normalising relations with Cuba. Cuban immigrants in the U.S., who want to see the Cuban regime crushed, drove American policy so far. The Cuba policy had isolated the U.S. in its own backyard. By winning Cuba back, the U.S. may win back some of its lost influence in Latin America. Congressmen of Cuban origin were the greatest proponents of the blockade because of their personal animosity towards Fidel Castro. Cuba has not been a threat to the U.S. for quite sometime. Even the U.S.’s allies were not with it in the case of the Cuban blockade. Cuban cigars and rum came to the U.S. through other countries. In fact, Cuba had maintained contact with the U.S. at fairly high levels through its ‘Cuban Interests Section’ in the Swiss Embassy in Washington to deal basically with the Cuban immigrants. Some Cuban diplomats were products of Ivy League universities and spoke American English like natives. Normalisation of relations with Cuba was long overdue and it is likely to succeed sooner than the two sides seem to expect in their statements in Panama.
The U.S. has nothing to lose by normalising relations with Cuba. Cuban immigrants in the U.S., who want to see the Cuban regime crushed, drove American policy so far. The Cuba policy had isolated the U.S. in its own backyard. By winning Cuba back, the U.S. may win back some of its lost influence in Latin America. Congressmen of Cuban origin were the greatest proponents of the blockade because of their personal animosity towards Fidel Castro. Cuba has not been a threat to the U.S. for quite sometime. Even the U.S.’s allies were not with it in the case of the Cuban blockade. Cuban cigars and rum came to the U.S. through other countries. In fact, Cuba had maintained contact with the U.S. at fairly high levels through its ‘Cuban Interests Section’ in the Swiss Embassy in Washington to deal basically with the Cuban immigrants. Some Cuban diplomats were products of Ivy League universities and spoke American English like natives. Normalisation of relations with Cuba was long overdue and it is likely to succeed sooner than the two sides seem to expect in their statements in Panama.
Calculated risk on Myanmar
The U.S.’s decision to make up with the junta in Myanmar may appear insignificant, but given the special position of China in Myanmar, it was a calculated risk. In the short term, Myanmar has brought economic benefits for the U.S. and Myanmar’s own desire to diversify its international relations has presented a window of opportunity. The risk is that the junta may not change its colour and the U.S. may be compelled to reverse its policy in Myanmar.
The U.S.’s decision to make up with the junta in Myanmar may appear insignificant, but given the special position of China in Myanmar, it was a calculated risk. In the short term, Myanmar has brought economic benefits for the U.S. and Myanmar’s own desire to diversify its international relations has presented a window of opportunity. The risk is that the junta may not change its colour and the U.S. may be compelled to reverse its policy in Myanmar.
The new
Obama Doctrine has already brought in changes, considered unlikely even a
few months ago. Nobel Peace prizes have been awarded in the past for
less spectacular successes in foreign policy. The award of the Nobel
Peace Prize to Obama in 2009 may have been premature, but today, the
decision of the Nobel committee appears vindicated.
(T.P.
Sreenivasan was the Governor for India of the IAEA from 2001 to 2004.
He is the Director General of the Kerala International Centre and the
executive head of the Kerala State Higher Education Council.)
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